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The Germans were actually aware of this invention, though what they did not understand was just how adroitly the British were using it.
One of those taken by complete surprise by it was Hans-Ekkehard Bob. He described a Spitfire formation appearing out of nowhere, from behind, a perfect firing position, and in poor visibility.
Lack of full understanding did not prevent the Luftwaffe from striking out at radar installations. The common perception of the German fighter aircraft that took part in the Battle of Britain, the Messerschmitt, is one model of aircraft.
In actual fact, there were two Messerschmitt models that flew over Britain during , the Bf and Bf These show that Emils of all classes, from E-1 all the way up to E-8, were in operational use during the period, though the vast majority were E-1s and E-4s, at least going by the loss rates.
The book concludes that many E-3s were likely converted to the E-4 variant. Both had MG17 machine guns above their engines which used an interrupter gear to fire through the propeller, a technology that had been developed during World War 1.
Holmes also explains that there was an E-9 variant, which, like the E-5 and E-6, was a surveillance aircraft.
These were converted to carry bombs so that they could, like Stuka dive bombers, engage in low-level bombing runs. Secondly, it sounds as if it was incredibly dangerous for the pilots.
Hans-Ekkard Bob is again quoted as saying:. A situation like that is terrifying. You can imagine it, you have a comrade or a friend flying alongside you, and then suddenly his plane dissolves into bits — if you witness that it shakes you to the core.
A crazy situation. For all their military might, the Germans were also behind in another important technology: radios. Like von Werra, Steinhilper is also a fascinating character, though also decidedly different to von Werra.
Lower-middle class and unassuming, the young Steinhilper found himself going up against the much-lauded old hands, mostly members of the legendary Legion Condor, in his efforts to improve radio communications.
In an exercise meant to simulate a bombing attack on Germany, Steinhilper had managed to put together a communication system made up of interlinked ground observers dotted around the country.
The practice was a great success and sounds like the kind of common-sense measure that should have been in place anyway. Yet, in a post-exercise debrief, Steinhilper asked his superiors about the system and if it had been helpful.
It appears that Legion Condor men like Galland had managed perfectly well without radios in Spain, and they were resistant to them going forwards.
By the time the Battle of Britain rolled around, German planes were often kitted out with radios, but Steinhilper laments how far behind things still were.
German bombers, for instance, were frequently limited to Morse Code, hugely slowing down and complicating the process of communication between them.
Another lag concerned the state of radio communications with German rescue units back in France. One of the biggest problems for German fighter pilots was the previously referred to limit on their radius of action, made worse by having to fly slowly to escort bombers.
This often resulted in Bfs being pushed to the absolute limit of their fuel capacity during their return flights across the Channel, and many misjudged things and ended up in the Channel.
There was a coastal rescue service ready to get these men but the radio communications to it were cumbersome. They had to go back through a central node in the network, then get passed on again in Morse Code.
The target was a fuel tanker that instantly exploded, engulfing not only the Spitfire refuelling from it but two more others sitting nearby.
He very cleverly worked out that there was a blind spot in a regular route march the prison camp guards took German POWs on to give them exercise.
Juli, führte zu keiner Reaktion. Weder die Ausrüstung der Kriegsmarine noch des Heeres war für dieses Vorhaben geeignet. Es fehlten Transportmöglichkeiten für eine Invasionsarmee.
Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe war Generalfeldmarschall Hermann Göring. Dieser zeichnete sich stets durch seinen vorauseilenden Gehorsam gegenüber Hitler aus, der ihm am Hitler sah sich nach dem siegreichen Krieg gegen Frankreich, von dem ihm der Stab des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht eindringlich abgeraten hatte, als hervorragenden Feldherrn.
Göring konnte bei der Schlacht von Dünkirchen seine Ankündigung, das britische Expeditionskorps zu vernichten, nicht erfüllen.
Dies ermöglichte den Alliierten, in der Operation Dynamo hunderttausende ihrer Soldaten nach England zu evakuieren. Trotzdem sah Göring nun erneut die Chance, die Kampfkraft der Luftwaffe, insbesondere die Wirksamkeit strategischer Bombardements, auf der britischen Insel unter Beweis zu stellen.
Die deutsche Luftwaffe zog fünf Luftflotten zusammen. Drei davon wurden für den Angriff aufgeboten: Luftflotte 2 unter Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring mit dem Ziel, den Südosten und London anzugreifen; Luftflotte 3 unter Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle mit dem Ziel, den Westen, die Midlands und den Nordwesten anzugreifen; und Luftflotte 5 unter Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff , die in Norwegen und Dänemark stationiert war, sollte den Norden Englands und Schottland angreifen.
Gegen Ende der Luftschlacht griff auch ein Verband der italienischen Luftwaffe , das Corpo Aereo Italiano , unter dem Kommando von Rino Corso Fougier in die Kämpfe ein.
Einem Befehl Görings zufolge sollten die britische Luftraumüberwachung und die küstennahen Stützpunkte der RAF in vier Tagen ausgeschaltet werden.
In einem weiteren Schritt sollten innerhalb von vier Wochen vor allem Produktionsanlagen für Jäger und andere Flugzeuge angegriffen werden.
Doch die britische Verteidigung war stärker als erwartet, und die Befehlshaber der Luftflotten wollten die Strategie unterschiedlich umsetzen, wurden aber auf ein einheitliches Vorgehen festgelegt.
Während Albert Kesselring von der Luftflotte 2 vor allem London bombardieren lassen wollte, beabsichtigte Hugo Sperrle von der Luftflotte 3, zunächst die britischen Fliegerhorste angreifen zu lassen.
Sperrles Plan wurde umgesetzt. Der Luftwaffenführungsstab 1c, verantwortlich für die Feindaufklärung, schätzte am Bis Oktober war der verantwortliche Oberbefehlshaber des RAF Fighter Command Air Marshal Hugh Dowding.
Auf ihn geht das Dowding-System — also das britische Luftverteidigungskonzept — zurück. Eine weitere Aufteilung erfolgte in Sektoren, die über jeweils zwei bis vier Squadrons verfügten.
Die Befehlszentralen wurden Sector Stations genannt. Aufbauend auf dem im Ersten Weltkrieg zur Abwehr der deutschen Luftangriffe entwickelten Luftverteidigungssystem, hatten die Briten ein modernes System zur Identifizierung und Abwehr von Luftangriffen entwickelt, das auf einem von Radarbesatzungen und Luftraumbeobachtern mit Meldungen über eigene und feindliche Flugbewegungen versorgten Informations- und Befehlsnetz beruhte.
An der britischen Küste befanden sich zahlreiche Radarstationen Chain Home , deren Reichweite sich bis zu den deutschen Luftwaffenstützpunkten in Frankreich erstreckte.
Über dem Binnenland wurden Flugzeuge vom Beobachter-Korps optisch verfolgt und telefonisch gemeldet. Die so gewonnenen Informationen wurden zunächst im Hauptquartier des Fighter Command der RAF, dem Bentley Priory , einem Herrschaftshaus nahe Stanmore , gesammelt und beurteilt.
Von dort aus erfolgte die Alarmierung und Leitung der Abfangjäger. Diese wurden dann mittels Sprechfunkanweisungen an den Feind herangeführt.
Limitierend dabei war die Kurzwellen -Technologie, welche eine ungestörte Kommunikation schwierig machte und deshalb ab September durch UKW ersetzt wurde.
Obwohl Deutschland bei der Erforschung und Entwicklung des Radars unter dem Namen Funkmessung einen technologischen Vorsprung hatte, war die einsatznahe Anwendung der vorhandenen Ausrüstung von der Ortung der feindlichen Flugzeuge bis hin zur Leitung der Abfangjäger durch die Briten höchst effektiv.
Die Entzifferung des deutschen Enigma -Codes in Bletchley Park , als Unternehmen bekannt unter dem Kodenamen ULTRA , lieferte auch wichtige Informationen über die Angriffe der Deutschen.
Um dem Pilotenmangel zu begegnen, wurden Piloten aus dem Commonwealth , Frankreich, den USA , Polen und der Tschechoslowakei unter dem Befehl der Royal Air Force eingesetzt.
Während sich Deutsche Jäger in freien Feindflügen auf RAF-Flugzeuge über Südengland konzentrieren wollten, wurden die britischen Piloten instruiert, alleine fliegende Jäger nicht anzugreifen, sondern nur dann, wenn sie Bomber begleiteten.
Dieser Fakt war ein vermeintlicher zusätzlicher Anhaltspunkt zur viel zu frühen Einschätzung, die RAF wäre erschöpft und geschlagen.
Bei einer als Abnutzungsschlacht geführten Auseinandersetzung kommt dem Zahlenverhältnis eine gewisse Bedeutung zu, wenn auch nicht die alleinige.
Der Bestand an einsatzklar gemeldeten Maschinen variierte täglich. Die Produktion an einsitzigen Jagdflugzeugen betrug dank Lord Beaverbrook Minister für Flugzeugproduktion in den Monaten Juli bis September bei der RAF durchschnittlich Stück.
Die Tabelle spart die 84 Messerschmitt Bf E der Luftflotte 5 Norwegen aus, da sie aufgrund ihrer Reichweite keine Möglichkeit hatten, die britische Küste zu erreichen.
Die Luftwaffe verfügte darüber hinaus über eine nennenswerte Zahl von Seenotrettungsflugzeugen, die in der Luftschlacht um England später eine wichtige Rolle spielten.
Insgesamt nannte die RAF um diese Zeit in etwa Flugzeuge ihr eigen, die Luftwaffe dagegen um , auf fünf Luftflotten verteilt. Obwohl bereits auch bei Tage Ziele an der englischen Küste angegriffen wurden, konzentrierten sich in dieser Phase die Angriffe der Luftwaffe auf Konvois im Ärmelkanal , in der Themsemündung sowie auf Marineeinrichtungen entlang der Küste.
Bei Nacht wurden Ziele im Landesinneren bombardiert. Sowohl die Luftwaffe als auch die RAF nahmen diese Gelegenheit wahr, ihre Taktik und Kampfkraft zu vergleichen.
Die Verluste bei den Alliierten waren so hoch, dass Konvois im Ärmelkanal strengstens untersagt wurden. Auch einige küstennahe Stützpunkte der britischen Abfangjäger wurden von Bombern und Jagdflugzeugen angegriffen.
Die Radarstationen waren jedoch sechs Stunden nach dem Angriff wieder einsatzbereit, da nur die Stromversorgung und einige Baracken zerstört wurden, während die Türme des Radars unbeschädigt blieben.
Das führte auf Seiten der Luftwaffe zu der Entscheidung, die anscheinend nur sehr schwer zu zerstörenden Radaranlagen nicht weiter zu attackieren, wodurch diese bis zum Kriegsende weitgehend ungestört in Betrieb blieben.
Due to its smaller bomb load, the lighter Do 17 was used less than the He and Ju 88 for this purpose. On the British side, three bomber types were mostly used on night operations against targets such as factories, invasion ports and railway centres; the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley , the Handley-Page Hampden and the Vickers Wellington were classified as heavy bombers by the RAF, although the Hampden was a medium bomber comparable to the He The twin-engined Bristol Blenheim and the obsolescent single-engined Fairey Battle were both light bombers; the Blenheim was the most numerous of the aircraft equipping RAF Bomber Command and was used in attacks against shipping, ports, airfields and factories on the continent by day and by night.
The Fairey Battle squadrons, which had suffered heavy losses in daylight attacks during the Battle of France, were brought up to strength with reserve aircraft and continued to operate at night in attacks against the invasion ports, until the Battle was withdrawn from UK front line service in October Before the war, the RAF's processes for selecting potential candidates were opened to men of all social classes through the creation in of the RAF Volunteer Reserve , which " By mid, there were about 9, pilots in the RAF to man about 5, aircraft, most of which were bombers.
In addition, more pilots were allocated to squadrons than there were aircraft, as this allowed squadrons to maintain operational strength despite casualties and still provide for pilot leave.
The rest were assigned to staff positions, since RAF policy dictated that only pilots could make many staff and operational command decisions, even in engineering matters.
At the height of fighting, and despite Churchill's insistence, only 30 pilots were released to the front line from administrative duties. For these reasons, and the permanent loss of pilots during the Battle of France alone  along with many more wounded, and others lost in Norway , the RAF had fewer experienced pilots at the start of the initial defence of their home.
It was the lack of trained pilots in the fighting squadrons, rather than the lack of aircraft , that became the greatest concern for Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, Commander of Fighter Command.
Drawing from regular RAF forces, the Auxiliary Air Force and the Volunteer Reserve , the British were able to muster some 1, fighter pilots on 1 July.
Replacement pilots, with little flight training and often no gunnery training, suffered high casualty rates, thus exacerbating the problem.
The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, were able to muster a larger number 1, of more experienced fighter pilots. Despite the high levels of experience, German fighter formations did not provide a sufficient reserve of pilots to allow for losses and leave,  and the Luftwaffe was unable to produce enough pilots to prevent a decline in operational strength as the battle progressed.
The Royal Air Force roll of honour for the Battle of Britain recognises non-British pilots out of 2, as flying at least one authorised operational sortie with an eligible unit of the RAF or Fleet Air Arm between 10 July and 31 October Among those killed were 47 airmen from Canada, 24 from Australia, 17 from South Africa, 30 from Poland, 20 from Czechoslovakia and six from Belgium.
Forty-seven New Zealanders lost their lives, including 15 fighter pilots, 24 bomber and eight coastal aircrew.
The names of these Allied and Commonwealth airmen are inscribed in a memorial book which rests in the Battle of Britain Chapel in Westminster Abbey.
In the chapel is a stained glass window which contains the badges of the fighter squadrons which operated during the battle and the flags of the nations to which the pilots and aircrew belonged.
These pilots, some of whom had to flee their home countries because of German invasions, fought with distinction.
The No. An element of the Italian Royal Air Force Regia Aeronautica called the Italian Air Corps Corpo Aereo Italiano or CAI first saw action in late October It took part in the latter stages of the battle, but achieved limited success.
The unit was redeployed in early The high command's indecision over which aim to pursue was reflected in shifts in Luftwaffe strategy. Their Air War doctrine of concentrated close air support of the army at the battlefront succeeded in the blitzkrieg offensives against Poland , Denmark and Norway , the Low Countries and France , but incurred significant losses.
The Luftwaffe now had to establish or restore bases in the conquered territories, and rebuild their strength.
In June they began regular armed reconnaissance flights and sporadic Störangriffe , nuisance raids of one or a few bombers, both day and night.
These gave crews practice in navigation and avoiding air defences, and set off air raid alarms which disturbed civilian morale.
Similar nuisance raids continued throughout the battle, into late Scattered naval mine -laying sorties began at the outset, and increased gradually over the battle period.
Göring's operational directive of 30 June ordered destruction of the RAF as a whole, including the aircraft industry, with the aims of ending RAF bombing raids on Germany and facilitating attacks on ports and storage in the Luftwaffe blockade of Britain.
On 16 July Directive No. Göring met his air fleet commanders, and on 24 July issued "Tasks and Goals" of gaining air supremacy , protecting the army and navy if invasion went ahead, and attacking the Royal Navy's ships as well as continuing the blockade.
Once the RAF had been defeated, Luftwaffe bombers were to move forward beyond London without the need for fighter escort, destroying military and economic targets.
At a meeting on 1 August the command reviewed plans produced by each Fliegerkorps with differing proposals for targets including whether to bomb airfields, but failed to focus priorities.
Intelligence reports gave Göring the impression that the RAF was almost defeated: the intent was that raids would attract British fighters for the Luftwaffe to shoot down.
Bombing of military and economic targets was then to systematically extend up to the Midlands until daylight attacks could proceed unhindered over the whole of Britain.
Bombing of London was to be held back while these night time "destroyer" attacks proceeded over other urban areas, then in culmination of the campaign a major attack on the capital was intended to cause a crisis when refugees fled London just as the Operation Sea Lion invasion was to begin.
With increasing difficulty in defending bombers in day raids, the Luftwaffe shifted to a strategic bombing campaign of night raids aiming to overcome British resistance by damaging infrastructure and food stocks, though intentional terror bombing of civilians was not sanctioned.
The Luftwaffe was forced to regroup after the Battle of France into three Luftflotten Air Fleets on Britain's southern and northern flanks.
Luftflotte 2 , commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, was responsible for the bombing of southeast England and the London area.
Luftflotte 3 , under Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle , targeted the West Country , Wales , the Midlands, and northwest England.
Luftflotte 5 , led by Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff from his headquarters in Norway , targeted the north of England and Scotland.
As the battle progressed, command responsibility shifted, with Luftflotte 3 taking more responsibility for the night-time Blitz attacks while the main daylight operations fell upon Luftflotte 2's shoulders.
Initial Luftwaffe estimates were that it would take four days to defeat the RAF Fighter Command in southern England.
This would be followed by a four-week offensive during which the bombers and long-range fighters would destroy all military installations throughout the country and wreck the British aircraft industry.
The campaign was planned to begin with attacks on airfields near the coast, gradually moving inland to attack the ring of sector airfields defending London.
Later reassessments gave the Luftwaffe five weeks, from 8 August to 15 September, to establish temporary air superiority over England.
The only alternative to the goal of air superiority was a terror bombing campaign aimed at the civilian population, but this was considered a last resort and it was at this stage expressly forbidden by Hitler.
The Luftwaffe kept broadly to this scheme, but its commanders had differences of opinion on strategy. Sperrle wanted to eradicate the air defence infrastructure by bombing it.
His counterpart, Kesselring, championed attacking London directly— either to bombard the British government into submission, or to draw RAF fighters into a decisive battle.
Göring did nothing to resolve this disagreement between his commanders, and only vague directives were set down during the initial stages of the battle, with Göring seemingly unable to decide upon which strategy to pursue.
Luftwaffe formations employed a loose section of two nicknamed the Rotte pack , based on a leader Rottenführer followed at a distance of about metres [nb 14] by his wingman nicknamed the Rottenhund pack dog or Katschmarek  , who also flew slightly higher and was trained always to stay with his leader.
With more room between them, both pilots could spend less time maintaining formation and more time looking around and covering each other's blind spots.
Attacking aircraft could be sandwiched between the two s. Two sections were usually teamed up into a Schwarm , where all the pilots could watch what was happening around them.
Each Schwarm in a Staffel flew at staggered heights and with about metres of room between them, making the formation difficult to spot at longer ranges and allowing for a great deal of flexibility.
The Bf s adopted the same Schwarm formation as the s, but were seldom able to use this to the same advantage. The Bf 's most successful method of attack was the "bounce" from above.
When attacked, Zerstörergruppen increasingly resorted to forming large " defensive circles ", where each Bf guarded the tail of the aircraft ahead of it.
Göring ordered that they be renamed "offensive circles" in a vain bid to improve rapidly declining morale. This led to the often repeated misconception that the Bf s were escorted by Bf s.
Luftwaffe tactics were influenced by their fighters. The Bf proved too vulnerable to the nimble single-engined RAF fighters. This meant the bulk of fighter escort duties fell on the Bf Fighter tactics were then complicated by bomber crews who demanded closer protection.
After the hard-fought battles of 15 and 18 August, Göring met with his unit leaders. During this conference, the need for the fighters to meet up on time with the bombers was stressed.
It was also decided that one bomber Gruppe could only be properly protected by several Gruppen of s. In addition, Göring stipulated that as many fighters as possible were to be left free for Freie Jagd "Free Hunts": a free-roving fighter sweep preceded a raid to try to sweep defenders out of the raid's path.
The Ju 87 units, which had suffered heavy casualties, were only to be used under favourable circumstances. This decision shackled many of the Bf s to the bombers and, although they were more successful at protecting the bomber forces, casualties amongst the fighters mounted primarily because they were forced to fly and manoeuvre at reduced speeds.
The Luftwaffe consistently varied its tactics in its attempts to break through the RAF defences. It launched many Freie Jagd to draw up RAF fighters.
RAF fighter controllers were often able to detect these and position squadrons to avoid them, keeping to Dowding's plan to preserve fighter strength for the bomber formations.
The Luftwaffe also tried using small formations of bombers as bait, covering them with large numbers of escorts. This was more successful, but escort duty tied the fighters to the bombers' slow speed and made them more vulnerable.
By September, standard tactics for raids had become an amalgam of techniques. A Freie Jagd would precede the main attack formations.
Escorts were divided into two parts usually Gruppen , some operating in close contact with the bombers, and others a few hundred yards away and a little above.
If the formation was attacked from the starboard, the starboard section engaged the attackers, the top section moving to starboard and the port section to the top position.
If the attack came from the port side the system was reversed. British fighters coming from the rear were engaged by the rear section and the two outside sections similarly moving to the rear.
If the threat came from above, the top section went into action while the side sections gained height to be able to follow RAF fighters down as they broke away.
If attacked, all sections flew in defensive circles. These tactics were skilfully evolved and carried out, and were difficult to counter.
We had the impression that, whatever we did, we were bound to be wrong. Fighter protection for bombers created many problems which had to be solved in action.
Bomber pilots preferred close screening in which their formation was surrounded by pairs of fighters pursuing a zigzag course.
Obviously, the visible presence of the protective fighters gave the bomber pilots a greater sense of security. However, this was a faulty conclusion, because a fighter can only carry out this purely defensive task by taking the initiative in the offensive.
He must never wait until attacked because he then loses the chance of acting. We fighter pilots certainly preferred the free chase during the approach and over the target area.
This gives the greatest relief and the best protection for the bomber force. Once over Britain, a pilot had to keep an eye on a red "low fuel" light on the instrument panel: once this was illuminated, he was forced to turn back and head for France.
With the prospect of two long flights over water, and knowing their range was substantially reduced when escorting bombers or during combat, the Jagdflieger coined the term Kanalkrankheit or "Channel sickness".
The Luftwaffe was ill-served by its lack of military intelligence about the British defences. As a result of intercepted radio transmissions, the Germans began to realise that the RAF fighters were being controlled from ground facilities; in July and August , for example, the airship Graf Zeppelin , which was packed with equipment for listening in on RAF radio and RDF transmissions, flew around the coasts of Britain.
Although the Luftwaffe correctly interpreted these new ground control procedures, they were incorrectly assessed as being rigid and ineffectual.
A British radar system was well known to the Luftwaffe from intelligence gathered before the war, but the highly developed " Dowding system " linked with fighter control had been a well-kept secret.
On 16 July , Abteilung V , commanded by Oberstleutnant "Beppo" Schmid , produced a report on the RAF and on Britain's defensive capabilities which was adopted by the frontline commanders as a basis for their operational plans.
One of the most conspicuous failures of the report was the lack of information on the RAF's RDF network and control systems capabilities; it was assumed that the system was rigid and inflexible, with the RAF fighters being "tied" to their home bases.
Supply Situation At present the British aircraft industry produces about to first line fighters and first line bombers a month. In view of the present conditions relating to production the appearance of raw material difficulties, the disruption or breakdown of production at factories owing to air attacks, the increased vulnerability to air attack owing to the fundamental reorganisation of the aircraft industry now in progress , it is believed that for the time being output will decrease rather than increase.
In the event of an intensification of air warfare it is expected that the present strength of the RAF will fall, and this decline will be aggravated by the continued decrease in production.
Because of this statement, reinforced by another more detailed report, issued on 10 August, there was a mindset in the ranks of the Luftwaffe that the RAF would run out of frontline fighters.
Throughout the battle, the Luftwaffe had to use numerous reconnaissance sorties to make up for the poor intelligence. Reconnaissance aircraft initially mostly Dornier Do 17s, but increasingly Bf s proved easy prey for British fighters, as it was seldom possible for them to be escorted by Bf s.
Thus, the Luftwaffe operated "blind" for much of the battle, unsure of its enemy's true strengths, capabilities, and deployments. Many of the Fighter Command airfields were never attacked, while raids against supposed fighter airfields fell instead on bomber or coastal defence stations.
The results of bombing and air fighting were consistently exaggerated, due to inaccurate claims, over-enthusiastic reports and the difficulty of confirmation over enemy territory.
In the euphoric atmosphere of perceived victory, the Luftwaffe leadership became increasingly disconnected from reality. This lack of leadership and solid intelligence meant the Germans did not adopt consistent strategy, even when the RAF had its back to the wall.
Moreover, there was never a systematic focus on one type of target such as airbases, radar stations, or aircraft factories ; consequently, the already haphazard effort was further diluted.
While the British were using radar for air defence more effectively than the Germans realised, the Luftwaffe attempted to press its own offensive with advanced radio navigation systems of which the British were initially not aware.
One of these was Knickebein "bent leg" ; this system was used at night and for raids where precision was required. It was rarely used during the Battle of Britain.
The Luftwaffe was much better prepared for the task of air-sea rescue than the RAF, specifically tasking the Seenotdienst unit, equipped with about 30 Heinkel He 59 floatplanes, with picking up downed aircrew from the North Sea , English Channel and the Dover Straits.
In addition, Luftwaffe aircraft were equipped with life rafts and the aircrew were provided with sachets of a chemical called fluorescein which, on reacting with water, created a large, easy-to-see, bright green patch.
Nevertheless, RAF aircraft attacked these aircraft, as some were escorted by Bf s. After single He 59s were forced to land on the sea by RAF fighters, on 1 and 9 July respectively,   a controversial order was issued to the RAF on 13 July; this stated that from 20 July, Seenotdienst aircraft were to be shot down.
One of the reasons given by Churchill was:. We did not recognise this means of rescuing enemy pilots so they could come and bomb our civil population again Ambulance aircraft which do not comply with the above will do so at their own risk and peril .
The white He 59s were soon repainted in camouflage colours and armed with defensive machine guns. Although another four He 59s were shot down by RAF aircraft,  the Seenotdienst continued to pick up downed Luftwaffe and Allied aircrew throughout the battle, earning praise from Adolf Galland for their bravery.
Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding. During early tests of the Chain Home system, the slow flow of information from the CH radars and observers to the aircraft often caused them to miss their "bandits".
The solution, today known as the " Dowding system ", was to create a set of reporting chains to move information from the various observation points to the pilots in their fighters.
It was named after its chief architect, "Stuffy" Dowding. Reports from CH radars and the Observer Corps were sent directly to Fighter Command Headquarters FCHQ at Bentley Priory where they were "filtered" to combine multiple reports of the same formations into single tracks.
Telephone operators would then forward only the information of interest to the Group headquarters, where the map would be re-created.
This process was repeated to produce another version of the map at the Sector level, covering a much smaller area.
Looking over their maps, Group level commanders could select squadrons to attack particular targets. From that point the Sector operators would give commands to the fighters to arrange an interception, as well as return them to base.
Sector stations also controlled the anti-aircraft batteries in their area; an army officer sat beside each fighter controller and directed the gun crews when to open and cease fire.
The Dowding system dramatically improved the speed and accuracy of the information that flowed to the pilots. The result is what is now known as an example of " force multiplication "; RAF fighters were as effective as two or more Luftwaffe fighters, greatly offsetting, or overturning, the disparity in actual numbers.
While Luftwaffe intelligence reports underestimated British fighter forces and aircraft production, the British intelligence estimates went the other way: they overestimated German aircraft production, numbers and range of aircraft available, and numbers of Luftwaffe pilots.
In action, the Luftwaffe believed from their pilot claims and the impression given by aerial reconnaissance that the RAF was close to defeat, and the British made strenuous efforts to overcome the perceived advantages held by their opponents.
It is unclear how much the British intercepts of the Enigma cipher , used for high-security German radio communications, affected the battle.
Ultra , the information obtained from Enigma intercepts, gave the highest echelons of the British command a view of German intentions. According to F.
Winterbotham , who was the senior Air Staff representative in the Secret Intelligence Service,  Ultra helped establish the strength and composition of the Luftwaffe's formations, the aims of the commanders  and provided early warning of some raids.
Keith Park and his controllers were also told about Ultra. This unit which later became No. Iwan Rheon.
Stefanie Martini. Guy Hamilton hat fast alle männlichen Darsteller, die in der Branche Rang und Namen hatten hier eingesetzt. Erstaunlicherweise kommen beide Seiten fast gleichwertig zu Wort.
Und da auch noch kein Sieger feststand, Mehr erfahren. NEWS - Serien im TV. Neu bei Amazon Prime Video im November "Friends", "Herr der Ringe" und viel mehr.
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